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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NA 'FURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11467 
This is an original proceeding to review and to deter-
mine the legality of an order and decision of the State Tax 
Commission of Utah imposing a use tax deficiency 
against L. A. Young Sons Construction Company, a part-
llPrship, in the amonnt of $5,540.24. 
DI8POSITION OF THE CASE BELOW 
rl'he plaintiff's petition for re-determination of the 
notice of tax deficiency was heard on October 25, 1968, 
and an ord0r and derision denying that petition for re-
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determination and imposing the deficiency was entered 
by the State Tax Commission of Utah on December 4, 
1968. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
By this review plaintiff seeks a reversal of the De-
cember 4, 19G8, decision of defendant. 
STA'l'EMEN'l' OF FACTS 
The defendant, State Tax Commission of lJtah, has 
imposed a use tax upon the plaintiff, L.A. Young Sons 
Construction Company, under Section 59-16-3, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. The plaintiff asserts that 
the transaction involved was "isolated or occasional" anJ 
that tlw exemption from taxahility of isolated or occa-
sional sal<:>s as provided for 1mder Section 59-15-2, Utah 
Code Annotatt~d, 1953, as amended, is applicahle. 
The facts in controvPrsy were settled by written 
sti]Julation of the ]Jarti0s, and also hy the introduction of 
uncontrovHt(•d affidaYits. References in support of tJw 
material facts will he ('it<•d hy tlH-' appropriate paragraphs 
of tlw stipulation (Stip. ·---) and the affidavits by their 
pag(' m1m1wr in th<' n•eonl (R. ____ ). 
Tli(' plaintiff \1·w-; a l ~tali partrn•rslii p and was Pn-
gaged in tlw ronstrnetion lrn;;i1wss clm·;ng thC' y0ar 1 !JCil 
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(Stip. 1 ). On or aho11t August 25, 1961, plaintiff pur-
chased certain used construction equipment from Amis 
Construction Co., an Oklahoma corporation. The sale 
was held at Atlantic City, \V\orning (Stip. 2) (R. 51). 
The seller, Amis Construction Co., is an Oklahoma 
corporation with its principal place of business in Okla-
homa Cit~-, Oklahoma. The regular course of business 
of Amis Construction Co. is the construction of high-
wa~·s, roads and bridges. Immediatel~- prior to August 
:.!.\ 1 Dfil, Amis Construction Co. was engaged in remov-
ing ovPrlll!rden at a mining site at Atlantic City, \\ryom-
ing. In tlw connw of this contsrnction job it used its 
eonstrnction t>qnipmmt. 1"'."pon completing the job, it de-
t(•J'mined to sPll sonw of the equipment used thereon in 
ordl'r to a\-oid the maintenance and transportation costs 
inrnh-e<l in taking the equipuwnt hack to tlw Company's 
main ha:-;e of O]H'rations (Stip. G) (R5l ). Amis Construc-
tion Co., therefore, conducted a sale of that equipment 
at tlte constrnction job sitP. The plaintiff went to 
·w ~-oming and irnrchas<:>d certain used construction equip-
ment at that sale and entered into a Retail Installment 
Contract ·with the seller. L. A. Young Sons Construction 
( 'ompany latE>r recei wd a bill of sale of personal property 
from Amis Construction Co. (Stip. 6.). At the time of the 
subject transaction, Amis Constrnction Co. was not and 
11\'\'<'r had lwen t>ngagPd in tlw husinE>ss of selling con-
:-;trnction Pqnipnwnt nor has it ever been involved in mak-
ing retail sales (R!51 ). Tn fact, Amis Construction Co. 
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do0s not now and nen•r has had a sales tax lic<'nse and 
dot>s not purchase anything for resale (R35). Amii:; Con-
struction Co. has existed for on•r fifty yeari:; either as a 
sole~ vroprietorship, partnership, and finally in 1959 as a 
eorporation. During this entil'P iwriod of tinH', it has hPlLl 
onl~; two equip1w•nt sal(•s (Stip. 7) (R55 ). It does not 
depend on rev<'mw from snch sales for its income. The 
sale was in no way a part of its business (R55). Of the 
t\\·o sales of usPd construction equipnwnt whieh Amis 
Construction Co. has hPld ov<'r its fift:: year period of 
Pxii:;tt·nc1·, Olll' was tlw salP \\-hich is involYPd in the trans-
action with the plaintiff and the other ·was held in Topeka, 
Kansas, on tlw pr<'c(•dingday (Stip. 7). 
1~pon its purehas<' h:• L. A. Young Sons Construction 
Company, tlw Pqnip11wnt was transport1·d into tlw StatP 
of Ftah and was usPcl in tlw plaintiff's constrnction busi-
ness. 
Tlw defondant Cmrnni:;s;on lwld that the transaction 
het\\·een the plaintiff and Amis Construction Co. was not 
isolatPd or occasional and not exempt l'rom taxation. It 
fnrthPr lwld that had thP transaction lwen isolated or oc-
('asional this C'X\'rn]ltion doe;,; not allp!~- to an out of statP 
transaction nor is it an Pxemption nndPl' t!i0 Fs<' 'l'ax 
Act (RGO). 
On "\ pri l :2(), 1 Dfi7, 1 hP ddendant ass<'S<'<l a usP tax 
cl<'fi<'i<·ne~- fnr tl1<• y('~H 1 %1 against 1ilai11tiff in the 
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amount of $4,646.74 together with interest thereon, as-
serting that the tax deficiency is a result of the failure 
of the plaintiff to remit tax on an out-of-state purchase 
snbject to the nse tax (R33-34). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
rrHE SALE OF CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT 
BY ONE CONTRACTOR TO ANOTHER WHERE 
SUCH SALE IS NOT IN THE REGULAR COURSE 
OF Ir:I'S BUSINESS, IS AN ISOLATED OR OC-
CASIONAL 8ALE AS THAT TERM IS USED IN 
SECTION 59-15-2, -CTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AS AMRN.DI~D, AND IS EXEMPT FROM A USE 
'l'AX. 
Section 59-15-2 ( e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
mn('nded, states in part as follows: 
" ... the term 'retail sale' means every sale within 
the State of Utah by a retailer or wholesaler to a 
user or consumer, except such sales as are defined 
as wholesale sales or otherwise exempted by the 
terms of this act; but the the term 'retail sale' is 
not intended to include isolated nor occasional 
sa1Ps by persons not regularly engaged in busi-
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ness, nor seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, 
garden or farm or other agricultural produce by 
the producer thereof, or the return to the producer 
thereof of processed agricultural products, pro-
vided, however, that no sale of a motor vehicle 
shall be deemed isolated or occasional for the pur-
poses of this act." 
The transaction im·olved in this case was an isolated 
or occasional sale within tlH' mPaning of our Utah statute. 
'rhis court dt>tennined in the case of Genn:a Steel Co. v. 
State Tu.r; Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P. 2d 208, that 
an isolatPcl or occasional sale is one rnadP by a person 
wliik~ not in the pursuit of tlw regular conrsP of his busi-
n<>ss of s<>lling tangihl<> pPrsonal iiro1wrty. 'I'lH· def(>ndant, 
Statt> Tax Commission of TTtah, in its Reg11lation f-138, 
lias rPcog11i7.ed this point of hrn-. 
''S38. Isolated and occasional sales (Applies 
to sales and use taxes). - Isolated or occasional 
sales made by persons not regularly engaged in 
business are not subject to the tax. Under this 
rule no sale is taxable if it is not made in the regu-
lar course of a business of a person making retail 
sales as defined in Regulation No. S27. The word 
'business' as thus used refers to an enterprise en-
gaged in making retail sales notwithstanding the 
fact that th<> sales ma~· he few or infrPqnent." 
:.'J: * * 
"No sale of an article of tangible personal 
property made by a dealer in such t~·pe of prop-
Prtv is considered to he isolated or occasional rP-
ga1:dlPss of whethn or not such articlP \\·as us0d 
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by such dealer in his regular business prior to the 
sale. For example, sales of electrical fixtures and 
appliances once used by an electrical dealer in his 
business are subject to tax. On the other hand, the 
sale of fixtures and appliances used in a clothi11g 
store are not subject to tax when the merchant 
sells them in the course of his modernization pro-
/Jrnm.'"* 
'rlw Commission's Rc'gnlation No. S27 also supports 
plaintiff's IJOsition because it limits a retail sale to a sale 
mad<~ hy a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer, 
<'Xce1>t for snch sales as are ddined as wholesale sah•s 
and arP otherwise specifically exempted under the terms 
or tlw Act. '11lw Commission in that same ngnlation pro-
('('<'ds to <'nlargP upon th<• i1wani11g of •·retail sah"' hy 
;tating: 
'' ... It includes any tr an sf er, exchange or barter 
whether conditional or for a consideration by a 
person doing business in such commodity or ser-
vice, either as a regularly organized principal en. 
dearnr or as an adjunct thereto. The price of the 
service or tangible personal property, the quantity 
sold, or the extent of the clientele are not factors 
which detrrmine a snlr tn br or not to be a retail 
sale.'"* 
As stated in that regulation, the price of the service or 
tangible rwrsonal propert_\' which is sold is not relevant 
in dPtennining whether the transaction is isolated or oc-
casional, nor are tlw qnantit_\' sold or the extent of the 
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clientele factors in Rnch determination. 'l'he fact that 
there was a snhstantial amount of pro1wrty sold by Amis 
Construction Co. at the Atlantic City sale or the fact 
that L. A. Yonng SonR Construction Company was only 
one of a nnmher of pnr<'has0rs at the sale can, therefor<\ 
han=- no hearing on this ease as acknmdPdged by the Com-
mission's own regulation. \Vhat is im1Jortant here is not 
how much was sold nor to how many persons, but rather 
\Yhetlwr Amis Construction Co. was a retailer making a 
r<'tail Rale in the rpgular course of its business. The facb 
speak Ploquvntly that such is not thP casP. 
Tlw defendant Commission has further snpport('d 
plaintiff's ca:cw h:v enacting its Sal<>R 'I'ax Regulation l'\o. 
S<iO which state::-: as follows: 
"SGO. Machinery, fixtures and supplies sold 
to manufactun'rs, husiness men and others (A1l-
plies to sales and nse taxes). - Rales of machin-
<'l'y, tools and other equipment to a manufacturPr, 
prodncer or contractor and sales of fnrnitnre, fix-
tures, supplies, stationrry, equipment, appliances, 
tools and instruments to stores, shops, businesses, 
t>stahlishments, offices and professional people for 
nse in carr:-ing on their husiness or prnfessional 
actiYiti<'s ar<' taxahle. Such sales are to the final 
l111yers or ?1lti111nte cmzsnmers nnrl are not sales 
for resale."''' 
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As noted in this regulation, the sale of equipment to 
contractors is not a sale for resale and the Commission, 
therefore, imposes a tax on the purchase of this original 
P([llipment. Had Amis Construction Co. purchased this 
<'<1nipnwnt from a rdailer \\·ithin the State of Utah, it 
would have paid a Utah sales tax because the defendant, 
State Tax Conunission of Utah, has taken the position 
that such a sale is not for resale, but is a sale to a final 
huyPr or nltimate consumer. This being the fact, the 
Commission should not he allow<:>d to now r<:>verse itself 
and sa>· that the sall' of original equipment was not 
l'\"ally to a final buyer, hnt rather for resale. If the Com-
mission ron::-;id(TS a used equipment sale by a contractor 
to lw a part of its regular rourse of business and con-
stitntes a retail sale, tlwn the commission should not be en-
titl<·d to collect a sales tax upon the original purchase of 
tluit (•quip11wnt. 
'l'hP facts in this cas<' an' that tlw regular course of 
lmsim·ss of Amis Com;trnction Co. was and is that of 
<·onstrncting highwa>'S, roads and bridges. Amis Con-
s 1 rnetion Co. was not at the time of this transaction, nor 
La:~ it ('VPr lwen, involved in making retail salPs. In its 
fifty ;:<'ar histor>·, it has held only two equipment sal<:>s. 
'i'liis CP1'tainl>· is isolated and occasional. Amis Construc-
t ion Co. has 1wv!'r he Id a sales tax license and has never 
ptrf'('ltased eqnipuwnt for resale. Under the Connnission's 
Tl.(•gtilation ~·;:)S, its mm example illustrat<>s the non-tax-
ahi I it,. o !' tlH" snh i('et transaction. BY illustration th<> 
• d • 
<'mnmission says that th<• sal<• of fixh!I'es an<l applianres 
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used in a clothing store are not subject to tax when the 
merchant sells them in the course of his modernization 
plan. By this same measure, a lawyer or judge need not 
pay a sales tax if he decides to sell his desk or chairs; he 
is not involved in making a retail sale. Likewise, in th<· 
ease at har, a contractor need not collect nor the pur-
chaser vay a sales or use tax on the sale of usPd constrnc-
tion equipment which it sold in its modernization pro-
gram. It was just such situations that the legislature had 
in mind when it Pnacted the isolated or occasional sale 
(•xernption. 
'Chis court, in GenPut SiPel Co. v. Htate Tax Co111-
missio11, 116 Utah 170, 209 P. 2d 208, cited with approval 
similar regulations of sc'veral otlwr states upholding tlw 
position L. A. Y onng Sons Construction Company asserts 
here. 
"Ohio's regnlation fnrnislwd this (•xampl<': 
"'\\'hen• a iwrson sells his honehold 
fnrniture; where a farmer sPlls his farm 
rnachi1wn,, or otlwr farm Pqni1mwnt; or 
\\'hPn' a groe<>r s<'lls his cash register, 
eonnters, or otlwr stor<' fixtnr<'s at anr-
tion or otl1Prwis(•, ;;;urh 1wrsons are not 
'<•nµ;aµ;ed in th<• h!!sinE>ss' of selling tangi-
hle JlPrsonal property at n>tail with n•-
spert to this Jll'O}wrty, lwt are making 
ra;;.;11al or isolaterl salPs.' 
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"Under Art. I of the Illinois regulation the 
selling of tangible personal property as machinery 
and other capital assets by a retailer which he has 
nsed in his business and no longer needs, and 
which he does not otherwise engage in selling as a 
part of his regnlar business is an isolated and oc-
casional sal<'. 
''The ahon~ rt>gulations, as well as those of 
other states which we have examined, definitely 
contemplate an isolated or occasional sale as one 
made by a person while not in the pursuit of the 
regular course of his business of selling tangible 
personal property ... " 
Tlw cr.se iires<=mtly before he court is directl~- in 
poi11t. (\•rtainl~· the sale> of construction machirn•ry hy a 
contractor is the same as a sale by a farmer of his farm 
irnwhim•ry. The facts disclose that the equipment sold by 
.\mi:-; Construction Co. had heen nsed in its husine>ss and 
\\-Ct"1 no longer rn•edt•d. It "·as not sold as a regnlar part 
oJ' Amis' business. The plaintiff, therefore, urges this 
( 'ourt that tl10 snhject transaction was isolated or occa-
:-;ional i;ncl<>r regulations of Hw dc>fendant and under 
tl1P statute> providing such an exemption as this Court 
l:a:-; int<>qll'Pted tlw same. 
POINT Il 
THE ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE EX-
E~IPTION CONTAINED IN SECTION 59-15-2, UTAH 
('ODE ANNOTATFJD. 105:1. AS AMENDED, APPLIES 
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TO BOTH THE SALES AND USE TAX ACTS AND 
'rO TRANSACTIONS BO'l1 H WITHIN OR WITHOUT 
THE S'rATE. OF UTAH. 
'11hc Legislature in ddining "retail sale" has categor-
ically stated that it is not intended to include isolated 
nor occasional sales. This exemption has bePn a part of 
the Sales Tax Act since its inception and has been recog-
nized both by the State Tax Commission of lltah and tl1is 
honorahlP Court a::; lwing a valid PXt>mption. Pt>rlrnps t}w 
most persuasive and Pxplicit case on tlw isolatPd or 
occasional sale provision is that of Unio11 Portla11d Ce-
ment Co. i:. Htnte 'Tax Commissio11, 110 Ftah !CJ~. 
17G P. 2d 87!). In this l'onrt's original opinion rqiol"tvd 
at 170 P. :Zd 1 G-±, thP Court ht>ld that tlw use tax \\'a::: 
separafr and distinct from tlw sah•s tax and that tll<' 
PXl'rnptions fo11nd in tlH· ::;alPs tax <lid not JH'C('ssarily 
('xis t as ext>mptions in tlw nsP tax. Upon rdit>aring, tlw 
Court conq ili'tP l~T rPvPrsed is position in tlia t l'Psrwct. 
'l1lw Court quotf:'d Pxtensi\'el:-· from tlw Third Bifmnial 
HP port ( 1985-1 ~n()) of the 8tate Tax Commission of U tali 
ill whi(·h the ( 'ornrnis~;ion point(•cl out tlmt s011H• Ftn}; rnn-
diants wen~ suffl•ring as a n•snlt of the sales tax, 1iar-
ticularl:' in tlios(' ~H<'as 1war tl1P liordPrs \\';l<'l'f' r<'sident~ 
ol' tl\(• state could go OY( r into anothn stntP arnl pnreliafw 
it1·111s \1·itlinnt tlH· ~al(':' ta;~ ;:ml hrinµ; tlt<'ltl ktrk in1u 
t:tnl1. 'l'li(' Crn!~rn'.c:s:on 1"·.-11t on fi:rtil<·r in its Bi1•1111inl 
n(•port lo not\" tl1at otltn ~tc\tPs Imel passPd l\C'(' tax lnw:--
wliieh Jiad tli<' pffr'et of irnpo~;ing- a tax on g-ood~ c-omin.!.t 
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into the t>tate for use and upon ·which the state sales tax 
had not lwt>n paid. In 1937 the Utah State Legislature 
ohliged the State '11 ax Commission of Utah by passing 
the Utah Use Tax Act which ·was passed in a form not 
as an amendmt>nt to the Sales Tax hut as a separate Chap-
tN. ln so doing, the Legislature did not reiterate in the 
nse tax all the exemptions available under the Sales Tax 
Act and since that date the Legislature has not seen fit 
to amend hoth acts each time it has amended one. This 
( ~ourt took further note that tht> State Tax Commission 
of Utah was also aware of the uncertainties of the law 
and, tlwrdor0, the Commission administered the two laws 
as though tlwy \\"Pre onP; and when the sale of certain 
pro1iert>· ·was exemptecl from the sales tax, it was also 
<'X<>m1>ted from the nse tax. The Court pointed out that 
in its Fonrth BiPnnial Report (19:37-1939) the State Tax 
('ornrnission of rtah reporfrd to thP Legislature that it 
had lwen so administering the two taxes. The Legisla-
tnn', hmYever, did not amPnd tlw acts to bring them into 
c·on<·lation, and tlw Con rt statPd as follows: 
"ThP h•gislature did not change tlw Use Tax Act 
as the commission recommended. One of two 
conclusions can hP drawn from this non-action. 
I•Mhur tl1e legislature did not intend the property 
(•xempted from the sales tax to be exempted from 
tl1P nsP tax, or the lc'g-islatnre intended the speci-
fic exemptions to the sales tax to also be exemp-
tions to the mw tax and did not consider amend-
Jll('nts rn'C(':c;c'.~ll'Y to carry ont that intent as tlw 
1'ax Commissi~n was already applying- the law 
ns so intended. 
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"Th0 second of the two conclusions is the reason-
able and correct one." 
Thus, having arriYed at this conclusion, tlw Court 
held in that case as follows: 
"From tlw lPgislative histor:v of the Sales and lJ S(" 
Tax Acts and from the administrative interpreta-
tions thereof made with the lrnowledge and im-
plied approvad of the legislature, it follmvs rather 
conclusively that the Sales and Use Tax Acts an• 
to 1w considered as correlative and complementary 
and that, as far as exemptions an~ concPrnPd, legi-
slative created specific exemptions from the sales 
tax an• also to he treat«d as exPmptions from thr• 
nse tax." 
It is also intnPsting and important to this case now 
hcforP tlw ('nnrt to i:'.kP a look nt tlH• !'acts in ':lint { 11.irrn 
Pnrtlrrnrl Ce1111 nt Cose. '1']1<> Utah :~l·gislabn·<" k:d nrnPnd-
ed tlw sales tax in :1farch of 1943 and ex«rnptt>d sah•s of 
indrn;trial coal from thP Sales Tax Act. 'rhe eoal was sold 
in -Wyoming and then hronght into Utah for nsP. Tlw 
State Tax Commission of Utah took tlw position that tlw 
us(• tax n]l1i1i(•d to i11is tr<ensartion. 'l'l1e Court held that: 
" ... Sucl1 1111 inter7)refat-inu wmtld discrimi11al 1' 
11.r;r1insf cord 7Jro11.r;llf 011t of flu: stiff!' i11 (aror uj 
rnal zmrclw.•wd in thl' state. The i1se ta.r was 11ot in-
tended to create; a discrimination against oid-of-
statc merchants in favor of Utah merchants.* 
Rather it •.vas passed, as indicated by the above 
qnotation from t11e Third Bi«nnial Report of tlw 
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'l'ax Commission, to remove the theretofore exist-
ing discrimination against local merchants in 
favor of out-of-state merchants which discrimina-
tion arose from the operation of the sales tax. The 
Tax Conunission itself clearly stated the purpose 
of the use tax on page 39 of its Fourth Biennial 
Report. It said: 
'The Use Tax Act was passed by the 
last legislature and became effcetive July 
l, 1937. This Act was passed as a com-
panion measure to the sales tax and acts 
as a romplenwnt to it. 
'The purpose of the tax was to over-
come a discrimination found to exist in 
the sales tax ... caused by the inability 
to impose the sales tax upon transacions 
in interstate commerce ... The tax applies 
primarily to goods shipped into the State 
in interstate commerce and to purchases 
made outside the State for use within the 
State, and in this manner acts as a protec-
tion and equalization to the Utah mer-
chant against out-of-state merchants who 
may he selling to rtah purchasers.' 
"l.t•gislatin-created specific exemptions from 
tlll' sales tax are also ext-mptions to the use tax 
regardless of where the snle of the property in-
1'olrl'd took place.''* 
*l~mpha::;is ours 
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Con tinning on, the Court stated: 
"' ... As before stated, the obvious purpos<~ of tlw 
F se Tax Act was to impose a tax on the use in this 
state of pro1wrty, the sale of which, hecause that 
sale took place outside the state, was beyond the 
reach of the Utah Sales Tax Act. But when the 
legislatnre hy the specific language of the Sales 
Tax Act carves out of those sales which it has 
power to tax specific sales and exempts them from 
tlw sales tax it clear!~· Pvidences a desire to ex-
('mpt the property so sold from the 2% tax, 
whether imposed by the Use or Sales Tax Ad. 
To hold otherwise would practically nullify the 
obvious legislative intent." 
'This casP aprwars to me to he on all fours ·\\"ith tlH· 
casP now bdon· tlw Court. '11 lw trasaction was a sal(• 
rnadP in '\Vyorning, which, if it had heen 11utd(• in Utal1, 
\\"Ot!ld not lw subject to tliu Ha]p::; rrax Act and likewii'(' 
would not lw snhject to tlw Fs(' Tax .Ad. Like the sal(• 
of the coal in \V")·orning ·which came under an Pxemption 
of the Sales Tax Act, the sale of this Pquipment in vVyom-
ing also comes nnder an exemption to the Utah Sal<·s rl'ax 
Act and is, therefore, not ~rnhject to the Utah UsP Tax. 
'l'lw d<:'frndant has raist>d the qm•stion as to tlw 
statns as an <>X<'lllption of thP "i:-:olat<'d or occasional" 
salu pro\·ision - tlrns 1·aisin~· th<' qiwstion as to wl1etlwr 
tit<' isolukd or oeeasionul sul<• provision is an "eX<'lll]l-
tion" within tliP Jllll'YiPW or tl1u [!11io11 Port1a11d Ceme1d 
rn. <1N·ision. Tlii;; <1011d 11n:: eknrl:· <\ll-;\\·(•]'(•d tl1is ql'('~'-
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tion m Genera Steel Co. r. State Tax Commission, llG 
Ftah 170, 2m) P. 2d 208. There the \Var Assets Admini-
c;tration had sold its Geneva plant to United States Steel 
and the Utah 'l'ax Commission assessed a use tax against 
!lcm~va Sted Company, based on the purchase price of 
tlw plant. Geneya St(~el Company defended the suit on 
the basis that the sale was an isolated or occasional sale 
and henre not a rt>tail sale upon which there is a tax im-
po~wd. Th<· Court again wPnt lmrk to the Uuion Porland 
C('/llrnt Co. case, citing tlw l<::·gislative histor~- and 
a[ firming the Court's prior determination that the Use 
and NalPs 'l'ax Acts an• rompl<'mPntary. 'l'he State 
Tax Commission of Utah mad<" its argurnunt as follows: 
"'l'he defendant argues that inasmuch as the sak•s 
tax is imposed upon 'every retail sale of tangible 
iwrsonal property,' the tax is in fact not imposed 
upon a transaction which is an isolated or oc-
casional sale for the reason that it is not a retail 
sale as defined by the statute and, therefore, it is 
an 'exrlusion' and not a 'specific exemption' as 
d<"alt with in the Unioi1 Portland Cement case. 
The defendant draws a distinction between sales, 
on the one hand, which it claims are retail i;;ales, 
but exempt from the tax, e.g. sales to or by re-
ligions or charitable institutions and sales of in-
dustrial coal, and sales, on the other hand, which 
are non-retail sales because they do not come with-
in thP d<.:'finition of a retail sale in 80-15-2 (P), U.C. 
A., 1943, as amended, by Chapter 92, S<"c. 1, Laws 
19·±:3, quott•d supra, (•.g. isolated or occasional 
sales. 'l'here is no merit in this argument. At least 
for thP pnrpos(' of intq.;rating tlw nse and salPs 
1;1.-...:: :wt:-; no distinrtir11 <>xists hd\n'<,n sa\ps which 
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the defendant calls 'exempted' and sak's which it 
calls 'excluded.' The nse tax doPs not appl:v in 
eithn instanc(->. . 
The Con rt w<>nt on further to state a:-; follows: 
''There is no valid distinction between sales 
which are not retail sales because excepted from 
the definition of the term 'retail sale' and sale~ 
which are not retail sales because they are not 
included within that term. A furtlwr proof that 
th<> IPgislaturP intended isolatPd or occasional 
sales made within this state not to hP subject to 
tlH-' use tax is manifested in the fact that the 19±9 
s<'ssion of the Legislature amended the definition 
1 
of a 'r<'tail sa!P' in tlw salPs tax act to pro,·idP tliat 
'no salP of a motor vPhicle shall he dPenwd iso-
lat<--d or occasional for tlw purposes of this net.' 
Laws 1949, c. 83. Had the isolated or occasional 
sale of a motor vt>hicle within this state prior to 
this amendment been suhjPct to tlw nsP tax, thPn· 
\\·ould have betm no point in enacting the amend-
nwnt as both the sal<-'s and thP 11sP tax ar<> impmw<l 
at tlw same rate." 
It is evident from tPh foregoing that the "isolated or 
occasional salP" Jll'Ovision appli<·s to tlw UsP 'I'ax Act. 
Althongh in th<' (fr11nc StceT cas<> this Court wt•nt on 
to sa~· that it expn'ssNl no opinion as to whdlwr isolatPd 
or occasional salPs made ontsid<> of this statP an-' snlijPe1 
to our us<> tax, it has snhs<>q1wntly amrn·<--red tliis cpwsti011. 
Jn tlw cas<• of Barrett l111·cstme11t Comp(lil,IJ c. State To.r 
('ommis.<:ion, 1 fi rtali :2d 97, :1:--\7 P. '.?<l ~l9f-I, th<' State rl'a~ 
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Commission of Utah imposed a deficiency nse tax assess-
ment on an out-of-state purchase of parts of machinery 
and <'qnipment which hecame component parts of a ski lift 
Prected near Brighton, Utah, and npon which parts no 
sale or use tax had lwen paid. The plaintiff in that case 
mw<l the argmnent that since the parts were to be used 
in building the ski lift and the sales tax would be charged 
on the pnrchas<~ of tickets to ride on the ski lift, then the 
it<'lllS purchased out of state were not subject to the use 
tax because it was property which was to become an in-
gredient or component iiart of the ski lift. Again, this 
l'onrt pointed ont and reaffirmed its decision in the Union 
Portland Ce1111'1it case that the Sales and Use Tax Acts 
are correlative and complementary to each other. The 
Co mt tlwn stated: 
". . . The nse tax act was enacted so as to 
amid competition and discrimination against pnr-
diase of goods subject to the sales tax and the use 
of similar goods \\ithin the state which would not 
lw subject to the sales tax because the transactions 
involved interstate commerce or becanse, as in the 
instant case, the purchasers went outside the state 
to hu~· the goods but nsed them within the state. 
'l1 lw sal<>s and use tax acts being complementary 
to Pach otht>r the exemptions therein should be 
construed so as to effectuate the same purpose, 
that is, if a purchase of tangible personal property 
is Pxempt nnder one act it should he exempt nnder 
1111· otli<'r aml \'ice vc>rsa." 
Tii(• ( 'oHrt re<'og11iz(•d that had thP Pxemption provisions 
or 1 lJP ~al<·~; 'rax Art 1wrtaining to tangih1P ]Wrsonal 
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vroperty been applicable, the property would not have 
been subject to the use tax. This is likewise true in tlw 
case now before the Court. If the transaction is not sub-
ject to the sales tax because of the isolated or occa-
sional sale exemption, then likewise it is nut subject to 
tlw use tax. Tlw test that this Court applied in the 
B nrrett I mxstm e11t case is not whetlwr the transaction 
took placP in or ont of the State of Utah, but whether tlw 
exemption applicable to the sales tax applies to the sale, 
regardless of when' it took place. If the exemption ap-
plic's to the particular sale, then it applies to the use tax. 
and no tax is assessable. 
PPrhaps of <'Ven mor(' 1wrsuasin•1wss on this point is 
tlH· case of 09den Union Railway a11d Depot Co. L Stal1' 
Tax C01nmisio11, HJ rtah 2d 2;)5, 399 P. 2d 14G. '11hPre this 
Court, for the purpose of allaying the fear that its initial 
opinion in tlw casP conld h<-> rnisint<->rprdPd, stated: 
" ... Since the above apprehension exists and also 
since our prior opinion might be interpreted as in-
dicating that certain transactions would be subject 
to use tax because not expressly exempted by that 
act, whereas, the same transactions, if they occur-
red ·within the state, would be exempt under the 
Sales Tax Act, \V€) granted the rehearing to cor-
n'<'t an.v un<'ertainty that Pxists in that regard. 
,, r n rpf<•n•n('(' to this prohk~rn, it is appro-
priate to consider the background and the rela-
tionship of the two arts. 'l'lw salPs tax was Pll-
21 
acted in 1933, imposing a tax on all sales of per-
sonal property within the state. See Title 59, 
Chap. 15, U.C.A. 1953. After several years' ex-
perience under this act, it ·was found that in nu-
nwrous instances, items of personal property, 
particularly expensive things such as automobiles 
and fann machinery, were purchased outside the 
state to avoid the Utah sales tax. It was to get 
rid of this tax evasion, to prevent loss of business 
to Utah merchants in border areas, and to tax 
nnifonnly all personal property when it was first 
pnt to use in this state, whether purchased in 
Utah or elsewhere, that the Use Tax Act was 
passed in 1937. See Title 59, Chap. 16, U.C.A. 
1953. It ·would seem anomalous if a commodity 
were exempted hy the Sales Tax Act, and thus 
not being snhject to that tax, would then be 
caught by the use tax. Because these two acts 
are closely related and complementary to each 
oth<>r, it seems both logical and fair that exemp-
tions under the Sales Tax Act should also apply 
1m<lPr the Use Tax Act. ... " 
'Che facts of the casP were that the Ogden Union Rail-
1rn.'· and Depot Comriany purchased coal in ·wyoming and 
mwd it in its depot husiness in Ogden, Utah. Thus, it is 
<'.]Par that this Court has recognized the position asserted 
in this cas<• h,\' tht> plaintiff that an out-of-state transac-
tion on which a nse tax is asserted is as much entitled to 
an an1ilable exemption as the same transcation ·would he 
11:1<1 it o<'<'lllTPd within this state. 
WP t·mhmit that from the foregoing authorities the 
Cnnrt sh011l<l <ldPrminu that thP isolate<l or orrasional 
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sale exemption applies to the Use Tax Act whether the 
sale is made vvithin or without the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the State Tax C01mnission of Utah, 
imposing a use tax on the plaintiff is in error and should 
be reversed. The transaction involved in this case was 
isolated or occasional and thns not subject to the tax im-
posed. 
Respectfnlly submitted, 
Connor, Greene, Nebeker & Horsley 
George J. Romney 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
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